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 Angel Quiles Thesis 
 A federal revenge-porn bill is expected in the near future, and many states have already 
adopted their own laws. However, there has not been a common consensus with a federal law. 
This paper will analyze the different state laws and court rulings to create a federal law, which 
will address a famous revenge-porn case – Lastonia Leviston v. Curtis Jackson (50 Cent). My 
newly created federal law should balance the individual’s rights to free speech and the 
government’s interest in protecting its citizens from unprotected speech.   
Revenge Porn Defined 
 Revenge porn is defined as the nonconsensual postings of images that were originally 
given to another with the implied expectation of confidentiality.1 According to Miami law 
professor, Mary Anne Franks, these postings should be considered as nonconsensual 
pornography.2 Professor Franks defines these acts as such because of the lack of consent that 
occurs when someone takes another’s private, nude, or sexual photos and then distributes them.3 
Posting these images may inflict emotional damage on the victim due to the deep and personal 
betrayal of the act.4 Since victims do not retain the power to control over who views their images 
their personal images can become circulated throughout the U.S., and sometimes the world. 
Usually grave consequences follow the victims once their intimate images reach the internet. 
Some victims have gained relief through state tort laws and criminal actions to combat revenge 





porn. State law violations, such as invasion of privacy, defamation, and intentional inflictions of 
emotional distress are only some examples of how victims have tried to combat such acts. 
However, the First Amendment is the biggest obstacle victims will face when seeking civil relief 
and/or when the government seeks criminal prosecution. 
Criminal and Civil Actions of Revenge Porn 
 A revenge porn analysis should begin with torts and then balance the individual’s rights 
of relief under the law of torts with our Federal Constitution.5 Damages for a tort action have 
allowed plaintiffs to recover for physical and economic injuries.6 Torts have also allowed relief 
for assaults on an individual’s reputation or invasion of one’s privacy.7 The types of torts that we 
will address in this paper will be invasion of privacy, “false light” portrayal, defamation, and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress.8 These torts are some of the ones that may allow for a 
party to seek damages for injury to their reputation in society. Before discussing tort law we need 
to address the common law doctrines of contract law. The principles of contract law will provide 
a background on the breach of implied and expressed assurance of confidentiality, which is the 
link that would allow for tort law to be used.  
State Contract Law 
 The philosophy of contracts infers that parties will come to an agreement whereby there 
will be a voluntary exchange of mutual benefits and considerations.9 If there is a breach in the 
                                                          
5 See Amanda Levendowski, Note, Using Copyright to Combat Revenge Porn, 3 N.Y.U. J. Intell. Prop. & Ent. L. 422, 
424 n.9  
6 See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 395 (1971) (“[D]amages have been 
regarded as the ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal interests in liberty.”). 
7 Id.  
8 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D (1977) 
9 See, e.g., Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U.S. 595 (1897) 
agreement then remedies incur to fix damages that were caused by the broken promise.10 The law 
of contracts identifies the binding effects of such agreements no matter if it is explicit or 
implicit.11 Under the Second Restatement of Contracts, “A promise is a manifestation of 
intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified way, so made as to justify a promisee in 
understanding that a commitment has been made.”12 The legal effects are the same no matter if 
that promise is oral or written, expressed or implied.   
 Under Cohen v. Cowles Media Co, Cohen, an associate with a gubernatorial candidate, 
wanted to provide information to a newspaper about a rival.13 Cohen gave such information in 
return for the newspaper’s assurance of confidentiality by being anonymous.14 However, after 
receiving the information from Cohen the newspaper company disclosed Cohen identity as the 
individual who provided the information.15 Due to the alleged breach of confidence by the 
newspaper company, Cohen got fired from his associate position. Because of Cohen’s 
termination of employment, a suit was filed against the newspaper for damages of a breach.16   
 The Supreme Court of Minnesota held that Cohen was not able to establish a breach of 
contract.17 The court did not find a breach of contract because a contract was not formed since 
the parties did not intend to create one.18 The court did not believe all promises should be 
considered having binding power.19 The court concluded that ethical relationships should not be 
                                                          
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 2 (1981); § 2 cmt. 







considered with legal rigidity.20 Thus, the promise that occurred, between Cohen and the 
newspaper company, was more similar to a moral commitment than a legally binding contract.21 
 However, the court also concluded that Cohen should still be able to state a claim under 
the doctrine of promissory estoppel.22 Promissory estoppel implies that a contract exists in law 
although it does not exist in fact.23 Under the doctrine of promissory estoppel, “a promise 
expected or reasonably expected to induce actions by the promisee that does induce action is 
binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcing the promise.”24   
 Despite approving that theory, the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled against Cohen on the 
ground that allowing him to recover damages would violate the First Amendment Free Speech 
Clause.25 The media had the judgment in their favor. However, the Supreme Court of the United 
States later reversed the judgment, which then allowed for plaintiffs to recover from a broken 
promise of confidentiality under the doctrine of promissory estoppel.26   
 Under Barnes v. Yahoo, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed 
with the theories, understandings, and applications of promissory estoppel and the claim of a 
broken promise of confidentiality.27 In Barnes, a revenge porn victim filed suit against Yahoo for 
failing to remove explicit photographs of her; although, an employee of Yahoo advised her that it 
would be removed from their website.28 Barnes was not able to sue Yahoo under tort law 
because of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, since Yahoo would not be considered as the 




23 Id.  
24 Id.  
25 Id.  
26 Id.  
27 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009). 
28 Id.  
“publisher” or “speaker” of the information that was provided by another content provider.29 
However, the court assisted with the plaintiff’s argument and suggested a claim be brought 
against Yahoo under section 90 of the Second Restatement of Contracts.30 Section 90 recognizes 
a cause of action for promissory estoppel, which does not bar such a suit under the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996.31       
 Courts have enforced private bargains under promissory estoppel for individuals who 
care to choose judicial remedies for a breach in keeping a promise. In Barnes the court held that 
if the court were to take this route and enforce such agreements it would not encroach on the 
rights provided by the Telecommunications Act of 1996.32  The Barnes court found that contract 
law deals with a bilateral agreement instead unilateral actions that are addressed in 
telecommunication law.33 In a contracts law case that addresses the promissory estoppel doctrine, 
the breach does not come from any non-contractual action or capacity of the defendant, but 
instead from an enforceable promise that is perceived as a contractual obligation.34   
 The two contract cases, aforementioned, are important decisions for the progress of 
revenge porn litigation. Although the court was well aware that there is a conflict between 
privacy and free speech, the promissory estoppel doctrine is considered flexible. Promissory 
estoppel is flexible enough to extend contract law beyond its commercial connections to the law. 
Each court has provided the opportunity to plaintiffs to argue for a breach of implicit assurances 
of confidentiality. Although a plaintiff does not have an ordinary contract claim, the courts 
                                                          
29 Id.  
30 Id.  
31 Id.  
32 Id.  
33 Id.  
34 Id.  
looked at state-common law doctrines in order to hold an individual liable for breaking a 
promise. This analytical understanding of contract law is important when forming a new 
perspective of tort law and its usage for revenge porn.    
State Tort Law 
 The right to privacy has been analyzed under many different perspectives throughout our 
history. The common census amongst them all describes privacy as an autonomous individual 
having the right to be left alone.35 The modern concept of privacy can be perceived as extensive, 
flexible, and even unclear at times because its boundaries have increased, tremendously, in our 
judicial system.36 Therefore, “privacy” should be understood in a nuanced manner having many 
meanings rather than in a traditional way.  
Violation of Privacy 
 Privacy is a concept that has many different meanings because it deals with the 
interwoven distinctive relationships of the individual and their society. Although the theoretical 
understandings of “privacy” are flexible, a more definitive definition needs to be created to 
become practical and in turn applied to the facts of revenge porn cases. Tort law protects an 
individual’s privacy from: (1) intrusion into one’s seclusion; (2) embarrassing facts going into 
the public domain; (3) falsifying information about an individual to the public; and (4) 
appropriation of a person’s likeness.37 Revenge porn invades the second and third prong, 
                                                          
35 See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 195 (1890). 
36 See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, The Assault on Privacy 25 (1971)   
37 William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 Cal. L. Rev. 383, 389 (1960). 
directly.38 Posting images directly on the web embarrasses a person in a “false light” by giving 
off a degrading or distorted belief about the person- suggesting promiscuity.39 
Defamation 
 “Defamation is the act of making untrue statements about another which damages his/her 
reputation.”40 The reputation of an individual becomes damaged because of the disgrace the 
person feels and the tainted name one acquires in society.41 Revenge porn damages both the 
individual internally and externally by portraying the person in a false manner.42       
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
 Intentional infliction of emotional distress involves an act that is so vile it causes trauma 
to an individual’s emotional wellbeing.43 Although conduct may be offensive it may not qualify 
to the level accepted for intentional infliction of emotional distress.44 The level accepted is 
heightened because it is reasonable to conclude that people in society must certainly cope with a 
particular level of “rude” or “offensive” conduct.45 However, when the conduct does rise to an 
“outrageous” level and emotional trauma occurs then recovery for damages can become 
available.46          
 It is reasonable for a victim to be able to satisfy the elements of defamation and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, since the postings would be considered a 
                                                          
38 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D (1977) 
39 See, e.g., Solano v. Playgirl, Inc., 292 F.3d 1078, 1082-84 (9th Cir. 2002) 
40 www.dictionary.law.com/default.aspx?selected=458. 
41 See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts § 559 (1977) 
42 Id.  
43 www.injury.findlaw.com/torts-and-personal-injuries/intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress.html 
44 Id. 
45 Id.  
46 William L. Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 Mich. L. Rev. 874, 879 (1939). 
“publication.”47 It would also be considered reasonable to find the postings of sexual 
photographs of another, for purposes of revenge, to be considered “outrageous” for its extreme 
offensiveness to the victim.48     
 In his biography, Mark Twain, the American novelist, described emotional and mental 
injuries from an unconsented disclosure of intimate information. Twain wrote about a love letter 
getting publicized without consent: “The frankest and freest and privatest part of the human mind 
and heart is a love letter; the writer gets his limitless freedom of statement and expression from 
his sense that no stranger is going to see what he is writing. Sometimes there is a breach-of-
promise case by and by; and when he sees his letter in print it makes him cruelly uncomfortable 
and he perceives that he never would have unbosomed himself to that large and honest degree if 
he had known that he was writing for the public”.49 
 Revenge porn is similar to what Mr. Twain was referring to; however, revenge porn is 
more extreme because of the distributive means of the internet. Revenge porn becomes 
worldwide since postings do not occur just in a pamphlet, magazine, or newspaper. Since 
postings become available for the world to see, the conduct should be suitable enough to meet 
the high “outrageous” test, necessary for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress.      
Complete Defenses 
 Although victims of revenge porn may deal with a substantial amount of turmoil due to 
the postings of their sexual conduct, defendants may still have a suitable defense. One complete 
                                                          
47 www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/may/22/revenge-porn-victims-boost-german-court-ruling. 
48 See, e.g., Vassiliades v. Garfinckle's, Inc., 492 A.2d 580, 588 (D.C. 1985) 
49 Mark Twain, The Autobiography of Mark Twain xxxv (Charles Neider ed. 1990) 
defense against the tort claim for invasion of privacy is “Consent.”50 Consent is a complete 
defense that can be raised against the claim for invasion of privacy or any other intentional 
torts.51 If consent were to be found by the court, then it would triumph over any of these tort 
theories.   
 Truth is another defense that can be raised in a revenge porn suit. The finding of “truth” 
is a defense to the claim of “defamation.”52 The argument holds weight in court because pictures 
only depict the truth without any perspective narrative attached to it.53 Photographs only 
represent what was seen at a particular time.54 Although the photographs may be unappealing 
and the photographer may have mal intent, the photographs, themselves, would not be 
considered as portraying an individual through a “false light.”55     
 Century-long judicial and legislative adaptations of common law have created our 
contemporary ways of assessing the law of torts. Therefore, the inadequate principals of 
traditional tort should not be the issue when analyzing a revenge porn case. The law of torts has 
allowed for individuals to use the judicial process to seek remedies for damages suffered by 
another through means that are outside of contractual obligations.56 Traditional law of torts 
focused primarily on keeping the peace within a community by giving money to victims of 
assault or battery. These acts were seen as a form of trespass to the body and monetary 
compensation was given so the victims did not become revengeful towards the perpetrator.57 
                                                          
50 See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652F cmt. b (1977) 
51 Id.  
52 See, e.g., Dianne L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 
68 Cornell L. Rev. 291 (1983). 
53 See, e.g., Cantrell v. Forest City Publ'g Co., 419 U.S. 245, 253 n.5 (1974) 
54 Id.   
55 Id.  
56 See, e.g., John G. Fleming, An Introduction to the Law of Torts 194 (2d ed. 1985) 
57 See, e.g., W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 117, at 859-62 (5th ed. 1984) 
These legal interests have expanded with time, now ranging over personal, professional, and 
business situations.58 This expansion has allowed for victims of torts to be awarded damages for 
physical, economic, as well as psychological injuries.59 Using torts to address revenge porn is 
just another part of this legal expansion – providing victims the legal right to fight for the ability 
to become whole once again. Therefore, tort law should be the relief doctrine that revenge porn 
victims should be entitled to receive. 
Betrayal 
 Laws on privacy have not focused primarily on the breach of promises for confidentiality. 
The justification for this lack of attention has multiple parts for its analysis. A breach of an 
assurance of confidentiality has more of a contract feel than a tort one. The Supreme Court has 
expanded the definition of the First Amendment Free Speech Clause to enable publication of 
particular information that has been lawfully obtained, which also relates to a matter of public 
interest.60 However, more recently some individuals have argued that the law of torts should be 
the focus in protecting an individual’s rights in disclosing private thoughts, words, or actions 
with their intimate partner without the distress of a possibility that their privacy will be published 
for the world to view and then judge. These same individuals argue that the law of torts should 
protect individuals from a later nonconsensual disclosure of any information exchanged between 
intimate partners. The latter way of thinking would not allow for the First Amendment to exclude 
victims the ability to get tort relief. Moreover, the damage would be considered a breach of an 
                                                          
58 See, e.g., Cantrell v. Forest City Publ'g Co., 419 U.S. 245, 252-54 (1974) 
59 Id.  
60 See, e.g., Andrew J. McClurg, Kiss and Tell: Protecting Intimate Relationships Privacy Through Implied Contracts 
of Confidentiality, 74 U. Cin. L. Rev. 887 (2006) 
“implied in fact” contract in not revealing confidential information to others. The damaged 
individual would call this breach of confidence as betrayal.61     
 There are many considerations why we must assess when analyzing a revenge porn 
situation. The privacy and reputational interest of the revenge porn victim should be considered 
legitimate. The legitimacy is prevalent throughout the United States since more than thirty states 
have provided some sort of relief.62 These states have provided relief because the defendants are 
publicly disclosing matters that are private and highly offensive to a reasonable person.63 
 Revenge porn, on the other hand, does not contribute to our society. It does not create any 
political debate or provide any public interest. Instead, revenge porn promotes only negative 
outcomes because it is highly offensive and immoral. It would be quite difficult to argue that 
revenge porn is justifiable and necessary for self-expression. It is easy to conclude that revenge 
porn is not a form of speech, but instead, gives a perpetrator who is mean-spirited, the ability to 
inflict harm on another unsuspected individual who trusted them. The victim’s trust in their 
partner to not publish any pictures could keep him/her from being able to obtain a judgment in 
his/her favor under the standard invasion of privacy theory. This perception proves to us, as a 
society, that betrayal should be the critical issue in any argument over the usage of tort law in 
order to compensate victims of revenge porn.      
 Betrayal is important for a revenge porn analysis. The essence of revenge porn is to 
publicly humiliate an intimate partner by posting nude photographs on the internet. The act 
betrays the trust of the victim. Posting secret photographs or information would constitute as an 
                                                          
61 See, e.g., Neal M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy's Other Path: Recovering the Law of Confidentiality, 96 
Geo. L.J. 123 (2007) 
62 See, e.g., Anupam Chander, Youthful Indiscretion in an Internet Age, in The Offensive Internet: Privacy, Speech, 
and Reputation 
63 Id.  
offensive publication of private details of an individual’s life.64 The law of torts provides 
remedies for an offensive publication of private details.65  
 There is one difference between the latter scenario and revenge porn. In a revenge-porn 
situation the publisher has violated an unspoken agreement between the two parties in agreeing 
to what can and cannot be done with the photographs or information. In a revenge porn scenario, 
the two parties would have agreed to take photographs and possess them, but not to publicize 
them throughout the world. That breach of assurance of confidentiality is what tort law should 
address. There are two different types of injuries the victim endures: Disclosure of information 
and the breach of confidentiality. Although both reveal secrets about the other, confidentiality 
also violates the trust within the relationship.66 The breach of confidentiality damages an 
individual’s emotionality because of the betrayal that takes place.67  
 Betrayal determines whether the postings of nude photographs are considered revenge 
porn or not. If there is a betrayal of trust and the victim is humiliated by the postings of nude 
photos, then it should be understood as revenge porn. The offensiveness of the publication 
distinguishes revenge porn from that of truthful and consensual postings.        
 The great thing about using tort law is that it would not only remedy the harm done to the 
victim, but also give them the ability to trust intimacy. In society, people move around with a 
façade in order to protect their intimate desires. Individuals do not self-disclose easily in intimate 
relationships because of judgments and lack of trust.68 When a person find’s an individual who 
                                                          
64 See Lewis v. LeGrow, 670 N.W.2d 675 (Mich. App. 2003) 
65 Id.  
66 Solove, supra note 61 
67 Id.  
68 McClurg, supra note 60 
does not judge them and makes them feel safe in expressing who they truly are, they learn to 
trust a person with their deepest secrets.69 If a person breaks trust in a relationship then it causes 
the other to never trust again, causing them to become afraid, and vulnerable of taking risks 
because of the fear of another exposure. “[I]f individuals cannot form relationships of trust 
without fear that their confidences will be betrayed, the uncertainty about whether or not their 
most intimate moments are being recorded [for future publishing] will make intimacy 
impossible; and without intimacy, there will be no opportunity to develop the autonomous, inner-
directed self that defies social expectations rather than conforms to them”.70  
 For the vast majority of intimate relationships an “express agreement of intimacy” does 
not exist. However, there is an implied agreement between the two that involves an assurance of 
intimacy. This assurance of intimacy should have the same legal ramifications as a written 
nondisclosure contract. Although it may be difficult to prove that there was an assurance of 
intimacy between the two parties, the lack of expressly noting it should not deny the victim from 
having the ability to show it.            
 It is unreasonable to determine that a victim cannot claim an invasion of privacy when 
the images were voluntarily given to a third party by the other. Professor Charles Fried of 
Harvard explained, “Privacy is not simply an absence of information about us in the mind of 
others; rather it is the control we have over information about ourselves.”71 A law abiding society 
does not force us to be completely open, but at the same time does want us to trust enough so 
that relationships evolve. This balance is in the best interests of our society. A balance must be 
                                                          
69 Id.  
70 Jeffrey Rosen, The Purposes of Privacy: A Response, 89 Geo. L.J. 117, 2123-24 (2001). 
71 Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 Yale L.J. 475 (1968) 
created for peace to emerge between a person and the collective society. Therefore, it must be 
accepted that our consent to one person should not mean we give consent to the whole public.  
 Throughout our lives we enter into a variety of situations based on assumptions of trust.72 
Information given to a spouse, a doctor, an attorney, or even a religious figure will be held in 
confidence because of the assumptions of trust.73 This notion gives rise to why our legal system 
has a doctrine of privilege and why tort claims result if assurances are violated.74 We can also 
claim this philosophy of confidence amongst ourselves with our mail system - if mail was given 
to the wrong address we are not able to open it and we instead have the legal duty to give it back 
to the courier.75 Breaking assumption of trust is unethical and illegal because of the ramifications 
that may occur if the behavior was rampant within civil society. This is why there is a duty of 
confidentiality when it comes to private information and if a material breach occurs then a tort 
remedy should ensue due to the damage.      
 As per my previous comments, the contract law recognizes that implicit agreements, 
promises, or assurances may bind the promisor.76 Moreover, it does not matter if the promise is 
oral, written, express, or implied because the legal effect is usually the same. Although contract 
law and tort law usually address different issues, it is possible that someone, who got harmed by 
a broken promise, may get relief from the doctrines of torts instead of contracts.77 A breach of 
confidentiality claim is not completely established in the United States, but some courts have 
recognized this claim for some individuals because it is a reasonable way to deal with balancing 
                                                          
72 See, e.g., Solove, supra note 61 
73 Id.  
74 Id.  
75 Id.  
76 See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 2 (1981) 
77 See  Keeton et al., supra note 57 
privacy and free speech rights.78 Therefore, it would make sense for tort law to provide revenge 
porn victims relief from an invasion of privacy claim if he/she could show that there was a 
broken implied promise of confidentiality.     
 Our judicial system recognizes betrayal in tort law. The United States Supreme Court has 
shown, “the common law is not immutable but flexible, and by its own principles adapts itself to 
varying conditions.”79 Flexibility is what had allowed the judicial system to evolve and 
continuously balance personal interests from social interests.80 For many years, tort law has 
taken care of rural communities that dealt with agriculture and urban areas that deal with 
industries. Tort law has addressed physical harms caused by others as well as products and from 
economic and psychological harms as well.81 For all these different goals to be met, the judicial 
system has recognized that the tort law must be flexible enough in order to protect all types of 
interests.   
 Revenge porn also deserves the same protection from the law of torts. The internet offers 
great opportunity, but it also creates many issues that are not foreseeable. The internet allows us 
to gain information, view pictures and videos and socialize. However, information can be easily 
posted for millions of people to obtain for an indefinite amount of time that victims of revenge 
porn can suffer from psychological and emotional harm. Therefore, revenge porn victims should 
ultimately get relief for such damages since the act should be considered “outrageous”, as well as 
having no social benefit. The redress should be accepted as reasonable for our judicial system.  
                                                          
78 See, e.g., Solove, supra note 61 
79 Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 8 (1996) 
80 See, e.g., Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 234-35 (1995) 
81 See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) 
 Under the Ninth Circuit’s ruling of Barnes v. Yahoo, the court did view the matter in the 
scope of promissory estoppel, but the reasoning fits within tort law as well.82 This holding would 
allow for victims to make a claim that is already recognized in the law of torts, under invasion of 
privacy by showing a breach of which implied agreement of confidentiality – betrayal. A 
revenge-porn plaintiff would have to show that there was an expressed or implied agreement 
between the two individuals, by which the pictures or videos only to be possessed, by the 
recipient, and the content would not be posted on the internet.83 The Barnes court understood the 
harm that a revenge porn victim endures, which they found to be “… dangerous, cruel, and 
highly indecent use of the internet for the apparent purpose of revenge”.84 They found that the 
doctrine of promissory estoppel would be able to provide victims with the ability to find relief. 
The Barnes rationale is what should be applied to revenge porn suits. 
State Case Law 
 Multiple states have decided to make revenge porn a crime. New Jersey was one of the 
principle proponents of this movement. In 2004, New Jersey created a law that made it a crime to 
take or distribute photographs of someone else without their consent if those photographs 
displayed her “intimate parts” or show her being involve in a sexual act.85 Although New Jersey 
prosecutors have not used that law often, they did bring a suit under it in the case of State v. 
Parsons.86 In Parsons, Parsons was in a short term relationship with a woman whom he had met 
online. Although the relationship was intimate they did exchange photos of themselves. Some 
photographs were unclothed with the understanding that it was only for the eyes of the beholder. 
                                                          
82 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009). 
83 Id.  
84 Id.  
85 See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:14-9  
86 2011 WL 6089210 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 8, 2011). 
The relationship ended after two months and the two got quite angry with one another. As a 
revengeful act to the breakup, Parsons sent the nude photos to the woman’s employer arguing 
that she was not suitable to be a teacher at her school. The New Jersey trial and appellate 
divisions held that the unpermitted disclosure of her nude photos violated her rights. Therefore, 
the case established postings of revenge porn on the internet a crime under New Jersey law.    
 California followed New Jersey, but with a more narrow definition, which prohibits the 
postings of revenge porn under certain situations. The California statute made it a crime to record 
and distribute “the intimate body part or parts” of someone else “under circumstances where the 
parties agree or understand that the image shall remain private” and the victim of the images 
suffers “serious emotional distress” from the postings.87 In 2014, Wisconsin, Virginia, Utah, 
Maryland, Idaho, Hawaii, Georgia, Colorado, and Arizona created their own statutes.88 Each 
statute made it a crime to publish nude images, or images depicting someone in a sexual act, if 
the individual making the disclosure knows or should know that the person in the image did not 
consent to such a showing.89 These statutes may reach the act of “selfies” just the same as if 
others took the image.      
 Today, in several states, revenge porn is considered a crime whenever the subject does 
not consent to the images being posted. These criminal laws address the consent issue rather than 
the betrayal issue, but the proof required to win relief is parallel between the civil and criminal 
system. However, one big challenge for victims would be to overcome the strength wielded in 
the First Amendment Free Speech Clause.                  
                                                          
87 Cal. Penal Code § 647(a), (j)  
88 See H.B. 2515, 51st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2014) 
89 Id. 
The First Amendment: Free Speech Clause 
 The reasoning for the First Amendment is to prevent censorship of free communication 
and the exchange of ideas.90 This speech is necessary in a democratic society because it holds 
people in office accountable and allows society to progress.91 Speech also serves other purposes 
such as artistic expression even if it may be an expression we may not enjoy.92 The trick is 
determining what speech is being censored because of something that a majority of society has 
distaste for or censored because it causes an actual harm.       
 The internet is an immensely large venue for individuals who utilize their First 
Amendment rights in order to exchange their ideas, expressions, and images about their lives. 
The First Amendment reads, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances.”93 Defendants of revenge porn have the ability to argue for their First 
Amendment rights, regardless of how unflattering the image may be or the effect that the 
publication may have on the subject if the image honestly depicts the photographer’s subject. 
Defendants have this right because the First Amendment protects individuals against civil and 
criminal prosecution for publishing a lawfully obtained image. 
 Individuals who post images can claim their right to do so under the protection of the 
First Amendment.94 Defendants will argue that simple depictions of nudity cannot be 
                                                          
90 See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) 
91 See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 339 (2010) 
92 Solove, supra note 61. 
93 “First Amendment”. Cornell University Law School Legal Information Institute. 
94 See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656 (2004) 
criminalized under obscenity just because they are considered indecent.95 State civil laws under 
the law of torts also raise the same First Amendment arguments because of the possibility of 
censorship.96 In other words, defendants will argue that revenge porn is constitutionally protected 
under the First Amendment.97 The First Amendment Free Speech Clause is a difficult defense to 
overcome.  
Protected Speech 
 There are a few cases that defendants would rely on in order to not be held liable for 
publication of true information. Under Florida Star v. B.J.F, the Court held that the First 
Amendment protects a newspaper for publishing the name of a victim that was legally acquired 
by a police report.98 Under Bartnicki v. Vopper, the Court held that the First Amendment 
protects newspapers who publish transcripts of wiretaps even if it was acquired illegally.99 
Defendants in revenge porn cases would argue that these cases do not allow the government 
from imposing civil and/or criminal liability on the publication of information that is true even if 
the state wants to protect the privacy interests of an individual.    
 “Offensive” language is protected under the First Amendment.100 Under Cohen v. 
California, the state may not ban language merely because it is profane or “offensive”.101 
Language that is profane may not be banned from public places. This notion also allows for 
“offensive” material that is sexually-oriented, but not obscene, to be protected under the First 
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Amendment. Under Reno v. ACLU, Congress banned the use of the Internet to display any 
“indecent” language or images which may be accessed by minors.102 The Court held that statute 
was unconstitutional. The Court reasoned that the statute restricted the First Amendment rights 
of adults. It restricted adults’ ability in receiving indecent-but-not-obscene material. 
Unprotected Speech 
 Offensive language can be prohibited or punished if: (1) the audience is a “captive” one; 
or (2) the language is “obscene.”103 Obscene is defined as lewd without socially redeeming 
value.104 Under Miller v. California, a work is considered obscene if there is: (1) prurient 
interests; (2) depicts or describes in a patently offensive way” certain types of sexual conduct, 
which is defined by state law; and (3) as a whole, lacks “serious literary value, artistic, political 
or scientific value.”105 Therefore, nudity, alone, will not suffice as obscene language – 
unprotected under the First Amendment, unless it depicts or describes “hard core sex.”106 
 Under Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., the Court held in favor of a plaintiff’s 
privacy claim because she was portrayed in a “false light”.107 The privacy claim was founded on 
a magazine story that incorrectly showed the plaintiff and her family at a time after the plaintiff’s 
husband had died. The important part of this case is the lack of truth.108 The errors are what 
caused the damage to the plaintiff. A revenge porn video or picture is also likely to create a 
damaging impression but on a grandeur scale. The B.J.F. and Bartnicki cases did not overturn 
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this case and are not perfect cases for all true information as well. In both cases the Courts 
explicitly stated that stolen information is not permitted and published information is not 
immune at all times.109 Therefore, the First Amendment does not prevent victims from getting 
relief for an invasion of privacy claim.          
Public Official vs. Private Official 
 Although it may be a difficult in overcoming the First Amendment hurdle, there are also 
some possibilities in breaking through such a tough defense. The defense of the First 
Amendment is not immune to acts of defamation and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress.110 Under New York Times v. Sullivan, where the plaintiff is a public official, he/she 
may only win in a defamation suit against the defendant for a statement relating to the plaintiff’s 
official conduct, if the plaintiff can prove that defendant’s statement was made either “with 
knowledge that it was false” or with “reckless disregard” of whether it was true or false.111 These 
two mental states are usually collectively referred to as the “actual malice” requirement. Under 
Associated Press v. Walker, plaintiffs can only recover for defamation if he shows intentional 
falsity or recklessness about the truth. This notion applies not only to public “officials”, but also 
to public “figures.” Public figures have to show that the defendant acted with actual malice.   
 Someone who voluntarily puts himself/herself into a public controversy will be 
considered a public figure for that particular controversy.112 An anti-abortion activist might be a 
public figure for any news story concerning abortion, but not a public figure for stories unrelated 
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to abortion or their private life.113 Also, some people may be “involuntary” public figures.114 An 
example of an involuntary public figure is a criminal defendant whose story is in a news. The 
defendant would not be able to sue and recover for defamation unless he/she shows actual 
malice.115  
 On the other hand, under Gerz v. Robert Welch, Inc., if the plaintiff is a “private” figure 
rather than a “public” figure, he/she does not have to meet the New York Times v. Sullivan 
“actual malice” rule.116 Instead, the First Amendment requires that the plaintiff show at least 
negligence. A strict liability test by the courts will not be enforced for defamation. However, a 
private figure who shows only negligence cannot recover for punitive damages. Instead, he/she 
must show actual malice to get any punitive damages. The First Amendment also requires that 
the defamed plaintiff show that the statement was false.117  
 The New York Times v. Sullivan rule also applies to actions for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress.118 A public figure plaintiff cannot recover for any intentional infliction of 
emotional distress unless he/she can show that the defendant acted with actual malice.119 Under 
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, Hustler satirized religious leader Jerry Falwell as a drunken 
hypocrite who has sex with his mother. The Court held that Falwell cannot recover for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, unless he shows that Hustler made a false statement 
with knowledge of falsity or with reckless disregard of falsity.120  
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Federal Bill Proposal 
 It will be a crime to record, take, or distribute photographs of someone else without their 
consent if those photographs displayed his/her intimate body part or parts, or show his/her 
involved in a sexual act, whereby the parties explicitly agree or implicitly understand, having the 
individual making the disclosure know or should know that the image remain private and the 
victim of the image suffers serious emotional distress from such postings. Moreover, a victim 
shall have a civil claim if these images are highly offensive to a reasonable person. 
Case on Hand 
Lastonia Leviston v. Curtis Jackson (50 Cent) 
 In 2013, Lastonia Leviston sued Curtis James Jackson, III, aka 50 Cent, for invasion of 
privacy intentional infliction of emotional distress and for violating her civil rights, under the 
New York Civil Rights Law (NYCRL).121 Leviston claimed Jackson wrongfully published a 
copy of a sex video that she made with her at the time, boyfriend, Maurice Murray. Jackson 
obtained the video by purchasing it from Murray and posted it online with added crude 
commentary. Jackson obtained the video while having a conflict with Leviston’s estranged 
boyfriend and rival rapper Rick Ross. Jackson publicized Leviston’s sexual activities with 
Murray, which continued to fuel the conflict between Jackson and Ross. Although, Jackson 
claimed that he had received sufficient permission to use the tape from Murray, the Manhattan 
Supreme court held in favor of Leviston. A jury awarded Leviston $5 million in compensatory 
damages and a judge awarded her $2 million in punitive damages. The judge awarded Leviston 
the punitive damages since Jackson tried to evade payment by filing for bankruptcy.122 
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Hypothetical Holding for the Federal Rule Proposal 
 If the federal rule were to be accepted it would be reasonable to conclude that Curtis 
James Jackson would be prosecuted under federal law, and Lastonia Leviston would be able to 
file civil charges as well.  
 Leviston and Murray both consented to making a video, which showed them nude and 
participating in sexual acts. The video was not made in secrecy. Jackson did not record the video. 
Jackson and obtained the video by purchasing it from Maurice Murray. However, Jackson did 
not receive consent from Leviston. Jackson received consent to acquire the video from Murray; 
however, Jackson did not receive consent to post the video on the internet from Leviston. At this 
time Leviston was not aware that Jackson had the video. It is reasonable to conclude that there 
was an implicit agreement between Leviston and Murray. It is reasonable to also conclude that 
there was no agreement between Leviston and Jackson of him having the video and then putting 
it on the internet. If there is not an implicit understanding between Leviston and the other two 
individuals, then Murray and Jackson knew or should have known that Leviston would not want 
the explicit video to be on the internet. Leviston suffered tremendous amounts of emotional 
distress as well as her children who are haunted by the release of the explicit video on the 
internet. Moreover, Leviston endured an increased amount of betrayal by Murray because 
Jackson edited the explicit video by portraying himself as a “pimp” and giving the impression 
that Leviston was a prostitute while having sex with Murray; therefore, casting her in a “false-
light” to the public.  
 It is reasonable for Leviston to be able to satisfy the elements of defamation and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, since the postings would be considered a 
“publication.” It would also be considered reasonable to find the postings of sexual photographs 
of another, for purposes of revenge, to be considered “outrageous” for its extreme offensiveness 
to Leviston.  Since the postings became available to the world, the conduct should meet the 
necessary standard of “outrageousness” test for defamation and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. Leviston would be able to show that there was an implied agreement between 
her and the two men, by which the video would not be posted onto the internet. Jackson’s reason 
to post the explicit video was to seek revenge on Leviston’s estranged husband Rick Ross, which 
has no First Amendment privilege. 
 The explicit video was obscene and it depicted her in a patently offensive way. As a 
whole the video lacked serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. Leviston is not a 
public figure, but a private figure which means that she needs to show negligence and not actual 
malice, even though actual malice is present. On the other hand, if Leviston was a public figure 
due to her relationship with Rick Ross, then she would be able to show actual malice since 
Jackson only posted the video to seek revenge with mal intent. Therefore, it is reasonable to 
conclude that if the hypothetical federal law would have been enacted then Jackson would have 
been prosecuted for this matter. Also, Leviston would be able to win her civil claims under 
defamation of character and intentional infliction of emotional distress. She would be awarded 
compensatory for her inability to work, medical fees, and legal fees. Lastly, Leviston would be 
awarded punitive damages because of the mal intent and to deter Jackson and others from doing 
such acts in the future.   
Conclusion 
 Revenge porn injures the wellbeing of another, who unfortunately trusted their intimate 
partner who had a malicious intent. Allowing revenge porn victims to seek relief due to a breach 
in an implicit promise of confidentiality can help compensate their ability to trust again. More 
importantly, creating or allowing a federal law in place, victims can find justice and a sense of 
peace. People who take advantage of others could pay for their mal behavior by serving time or 
compensating their victims. The criminal and civil remedies would not harm the value of 
legitimate free speech under the First Amendment, and it would protect those who have been 
harmed in such an outrageous manner.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
